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* A Theory of the Allocation of Time (Becker, 1965)

 

* Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes (Kreps, Scheinkman, 1983)

* Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility (Katz, Shapiro, 1985)

 

* A Model of Sales (Varian, 1980)

* Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion (Whinston, 1990)

* Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk (Kahneman, Tversky, 1979)

* Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk (Bernoulli, 1954 (1738))

* Non-Cooperative Games (Nash, 1951)

* Time Schedule and Program Profile: TV News in Norway and Denmark (Nilssen, Sorgard, 1998)

 

* Two-Person Cooperative Games (Nash, 1953)

* Agreeing to Disagree (Aumann, 1976)

 

* The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling (Binmore, Rubinstein, Wolinsky, 1986)

* The Market for «Lemons»: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (Akerlof, 1970)

* Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device (Shapiro, Stiglitz, 1984)

 

* Moral Hazard in Teams (Holmström, 1982)

 

* Job Market Signaling (Spence, 1973)

 

* Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information (Stiglitz, Weiss, 1981)

* A Theory of Rational Addiction (Becker, Murphy, 1988)

 

* Theory of Marriage: Part I (Becker, 1973)

 

* The Economics of Brushing Teeth (Blinder, 1974)

 

* A Model of Declining Health and Retirement (Wolfe, 1985)

 

* Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach (Becker, 1968)

 

* Price Competition in a Channel Structure with a Common Retailer (Choi, 1991)

 

* Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality (Milgrom, Roberts, 1986)

 

* The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look (Fudenberg, Tirole, 1984)

* Advocates (Dewatripont, Tirole, 1999)

* A Theory of Social Interactions (Becker, 1974)

 

1. Akerlof, George. The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. -- The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No. 3. (1970), pp. 488-500.
2. Aumann, Robert. Agreeing to Disagree. -- The Annals of Statistics, Vol. 4, No. 6. (1976), pp. 1236-1239.
3. Becker, Gary. A Theory of the Allocation of Time. -- The Economic Journal, Vol. 75, No. 299. (1965), pp. 493-517.
4. Becker, Gary. A Theory of Social Interactions. -- The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 82, No. 6. (1974), pp. 1063-1093.
5. Becker, Gary; Kevin Murphy. A Theory of Rational Addiction. -- The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 96, No. 4. (1988), pp. 675-700.
6. Becker, Gary. A Theory of Marriage: Part I. -- The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 81, No. 4. (1973), pp. 813-846.
7. Becker, Gary. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. -- The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 76, No. 2. (1968), pp. 169-217.
8. Bernoulli, Daniel. Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk. -- Econometrica, Vol. 22, No. 1. (1954), pp. 23-36.
9. Binmore, Ken; Ariel Rubinstein; Asher Wolinsky. The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling. -- The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 17, No. 2. (1986), pp. 176-188.
10. Blinder, Alan. The Economics of Brushing Teeth. -- The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 82, No. 4. (1974), pp. 887-891.
11. Choi, Chan. Price Competition in a Channel Structure with a Common Retailer. -- Marketing Science, Vol. 10, No. 4. (1991), pp. 271-296.
12. Dewatripont, Mathias; Jean Tirole. Advocates. -- The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107, No. 1. (1999), pp. 1-39.
13. Fudenberg, Drew; Jean Tirole. The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look. -- The American Economic Review, Vol. 74, No. 2. (1984), pp. 361-366.
14. Holmstrom, Bengt. Moral Hazard in Teams. -- The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 2. (1982), pp. 324-340.
15. Kahneman, Daniel; Amos Tversky. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. -- Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 2. (1979), pp. 263-292.
16. Katz, Michael; Carl Shapiro. Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility. -- The American Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 3. (1985), pp. 424-440.
17. Kreps, David; Jose Scheinkman. Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes. -- The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 14, No. 2. (1983), pp. 326-337.
18. Milgrom, Paul; John Roberts. Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality. -- The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4. (1986), pp. 796-821.
19. Nash, John. Non-Cooperative Games. -- The Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 54, No. 2. (September 1951), pp. 286-295.
20. Nash, John. Two-Person Cooperative Games. -- Econometrica, Vol. 21, No. 1. (1953), pp. 128-140.
21. Nilssen, Tore; Lars Sørgard. Time Schedule and Program Profile: TV News in Norway and Denmark. -- Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 7 (1998), pp. 209-235.
22. Shapiro, Carl; Joseph Stiglitz. Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device. -- The American Economic Review, Vol. 74, No. 3. (1984), pp. 433-444.
23. Spence, Michael. Job Market Signaling. -- The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 87, No. 3. (1973), pp. 355-374.
24. Stiglitz, Joseph; Andrew Weiss. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. -- The American Economic Review, Vol. 71, No. 3. (1981), pp. 393-410.
25. Varian, Hal. A Model of Sales. -- The American Economic Review, Vol. 70, No. 4. (1980), pp. 651-659.
26. Vickrey, William. Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. -- The Journal of Finance, Vol. 16, No. 1. (1961), pp. 8-37.
27. Whinston, Michael. Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion. -- The American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 4. (1990), pp. 837-859.
28. Wolfe, John. A Model of Declining Health and Retirement. -- Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93, No. 6. (1985), pp. 1258-67.